The works of the French essayist reflect his views of morality, society, and customs in the late sixteenth century.

A superb achievement, one that successfully brings together in accessible form the work of two major writers of Renaissance France. This is now the default version of Montaigne in English. --Timothy Hampton, Professor of French and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley.

Under the pretense of defending an obscure treatise by a Catalan theologian, Sebond, Montaigne attacks the philosophers who attempt rational explanations of the universe and argues for a skeptical Christianity based squarely on faith rather than reason. The result is the _Apology for Raymond Sebond_, a classic of Counter-Reformation thought and a masterpiece of Renaissance literature. This new translation by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene achieves both accuracy and fluency, conveying at once the nuances of Montaigne’s arguments and (...) his distinctive literary style. (shrink)

An essential companion to the most relevant works of Michel de Montaigne Essays: The Philosophy Classic delivers a carefully curated collection of thought-provoking works by sixteenth-century thinker Michel De Montaigne. Exploring topics as diverse as politics, poetry, love, friendship and the purpose of philosophy, this latest entry in the celebrated Capstone Classics series is accessible and intuitively organized. Follow the thoughts of the person who created the essay genre in literature as he expresses his philosophy, interests, (...) and learning. Throughout, you’ll be guided by an expansive introduction by leading Montaigne scholar Philippe Desan and the comments of series editor Tom Butler-Bowdon, placing the work of Montaigne in its historical and philosophical context. You’ll also find: Celebrated and famous works by Montaigne, including noted classics like “That to Study Philosophy is to Learn to Die” Lesser-known works that have taken on increased importance in the unique context of the 21st-century A version of the popular Charles Cotton translation first published in 1685: a simple, faithful, and clear adaptation of the French original An invaluable resource for anyone interested in the insightful and illuminating work of one of the most enduring thinkers of the 16th-century, Essays: The Philosophy Classic is an essential addition to the libraries of philosophers, historians, and laypeople seeking an eye-opening and fascinating exploration of life itself. (shrink)

Michel de Montaigne, the inventor of the essay, has always been acknowledged as a great literary figure but has never been thought of as a philosophical original. This book treats Montaigne as a serious thinker in his own right, taking as its point of departure Montaigne's description of himself as 'an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher'. Whereas previous commentators have treated Montaigne's Essays as embodying a scepticism harking back to classical sources, Ann Hartle offers an account (...) that reveals Montaigne's thought to be dialectical, transforming sceptical doubt into wonder at the most familiar aspects of life. This major reassessment of a much admired but also much underestimated thinker will interest a wide range of historians of philosophy as well as scholars in comparative literature, French studies and the history of ideas. (shrink)

The main purpose of this dissertation is to develop a specific perspective on the history of human thought. This goal can be achieved by critically reflecting on the dominant concept of modernity, linked with the idea of teleological and linear development, which underlies the common vision of history. The proposed approach is grounded in an in-depth analysis of the life and work of Michel de Montaigne, drawing on numerous achievements in intellectual history, conceptual history, and the history of (...) philosophy, simultaneously outlining a novel approach to the history of human thought. The first part of the dissertation revises the concept of modernity, surveys various philosophical interpretations of history (in dialogue with contemporary historiography), and finally outlines reworked notions of modernity and postmodernity. These considerations are based on discussions of history and historicity undertaken by various authors, especially Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. It is especially the latter’s contribution in this area that has been so far underestimated, especially in Poland. What emerges is an image of history as a nexus of changes, neither absolutely progressive nor regressive, occurring in three dimensions: material, linguistic, and mental. Consequently, it appears necessary to take their intertwining into account in all historical research. Contrary to what the dominant notion of modernity suggests, these intersections are in fact argued to facilitate non-dogmatic thinking in any period or moment in history. The second part of the dissertation turns to Montaigne’s Essais – a work whose publication was an exceptional event in intellectual history, which is argued to confirm the previously formulated theses. First, a theoretical construct is introduced, describing the structure of human reality, termed “the structure of authority.” It defines the system of relations that shape the existence of every human being: relations of power, knowledge, and faith. This system of relations is demonstrated using the example of the early modern era. Against this background, Montaigne appears as an author who questioned or at least attenuated the structure of authority in his time because he now appears as a modern or even postmodern writer who was ahead of his time. The first part of the thesis consists of five chapters, two directly addressing the concept of modernity (chapters 1 and 5), one discussing the concept of history (chapter 2), and two other dealing with specific concepts of history developed by Foucault and Derrida (chapters 3 and 4). The second part elaborates on the concept of the structure of authority (chapter 6), and applies it in practice to discuss the early modern period (chapter 7) when Montaigne lived and wrote. His thought is analysed in two subsequent chapters (8 and 9). The author of Essais is argued to be a coherent thinker despite the numerous contradictions found in his work, as well as the originator of the “essay” method. Discussion covers many of his concepts and ideas, as well as his political and religious views. The conclusion gathers all reflections and summarizes the results. (shrink)

Mark Greengrass - Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 355-356 Ann Hartle. Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp viii + 303. Cloth, $60.00. « Nouvelle figure: un philosophe impremedité et fortuite ! » [A new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher!]. Thus writes Montaigne in a paragraph all to itself, initially his own manuscript addition to (...) his copy of the 1588 edition of the Essais and one of the numerous changes that appeared to the text published in 1595, three years after his death. The phrase provides the axis for Ann Hartle's excellent and innovative study of Montaigne as a philosopher. Her central.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Michel de Montaigne: Accidental PhilosopherZahi ZallouaMichel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, by Ann Hartle ; 303 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. $60.00.Ann Hartle's new book is arguably the clearest and most compelling interpretation of Montaigne as a genuine philosopher since Hugo Friedrich's masterful Montaigne (1949). Her study is indeed an emphatic response to Friedrich's call to read Montaigne philosophically. Hartle derives her (...) almost oxymoronic title from Montaigne's own self-description as "a new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher." Taking Montaigne's moment of self-discovery à la lettre, Hartle systematically proceeds to elucidate the full meaning of Montaigne's observation. What emerges from her reading is a radical thinker who breaks with ancient philosophy and medieval theology. Her Montaigne, however, does not disavow the past but ultimately enriches it, building upon prior models. In this respect, the essayist practices the Renaissance art of imitation—creative imitation that repeats but also alters its exemplary model in a move to rival it. While Hartle exhibits an outstanding knowledge of the history of philosophy—from Plato to Heidegger, passing through Machiavelli, Hume, and Rousseau—her book is not itself a historical study nor a work in the history of ideas: she insists that her interpretation is conceptual rather than historical.What is accidental philosophy? It is foremost a non-authoritative, thoroughly human philosophy, one which takes as a sine qua non the recognition of the world's contingency—an awareness that things might have been radically different. Accidental philosophy thus represents nothing short of a displacement and transformation of reason, a calling into question of its traditional sovereign and divine-like status. (One thinks here of Aristotle's notion of the active intellect [nous poetikos], which he considers to be divine in man in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics.) Rejecting the belief in an autonomous reason, Montaigne renders problematic the possibility of "deliberative philosophy" (accidental philosophy's counterpart): "the exercise of reason as rule within the soul, a place and function that reason claims for itself on the basis of its superiority with the hierarchy of nature." In his critique of reason—most eloquently displayed in the "Apology for Raymond Sebond," chapter 12 of [End Page 441] Book II of the Essays—Montaigne might be seen as proto-postmodernist, occupying a similar position as Nietzsche in a history of counter-Enlightenment thought. But such an interpretation, argues Hartle, is on the whole inaccurate, given Montaigne's commitment to truth.As would be expected in a book about Montaigne's philosophy, skepticism plays a major role in Hartle's positive assessment of the essayist. Skepticism has traditionally been interpreted in Montaigne scholarship either as a stage in the evolution of the essayist's thought, or as an expression of his fideism. The evolutionary reading was first championed by Pierre Villey in Les Sources et l'évolution des "Essais" de Montaigne (1933), in which he argued that Montaigne's thought evolved through three stages: Stoicism, Skepticism, and Naturalism (or Epicureanism). This now unpopular view was nevertheless recently reaffirmed by David Quint in his well-received Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy (1998). The essayist's fideism, on the other hand, is more readily accepted in Montaigne circles. It is commonly accepted that Montaigne's skepticism functions in a way that undermines reason's authority while leaving room for faith in religious matters. Hartle's understanding of Montaigne's skepticism differs in a major way from both of these accounts. She asks: "Does skepticism provide us with a complete and adequate understanding of Montaigne's philosophical activity?" Hartle offers a seemingly definitive answer: "Montaigne is not a skeptic" (p. 15). Yet, she makes her response more nuanced in several passage of her study, arguing again not for a clean break with ancient skep-ticism but with a profound transformation of this dominant philosophical school.What we have, then, is a "skeptical moment" rather than a full-fledged skeptical suspension of judgment. And it is in this moment that an openness to the possible—such as the discovery of the strange in the familiar—is made manifest. Hartle rightly points to Montaigne's discovery of his own... (shrink)

“Conflict” in the Works of Michel de Montaigne The “philosophical” style specific to Montaigne’s Essays, totally devoid of demonstration and system, gives the reader the possibility of “essaying” an experience of his own reading, based on the idea that “Words belong half to the speaker, half to the hearer” (III, 13). Following Montaigne’s idea that selfishness is the basis of solidarity between men (the basis of society), we can detect two levels in this political conception: 1) (...) on the one hand, the relationship between the individual subject and his own complex state; 2) on the other hand, the relationship of the individual to otherness. For Montaigne, the first level is a priority and, as his own political experience shows, the individual subject has above all the duty to remain true to himself and to his own temperament. The duty to serve others is secondary, occasional and moderate. To complete the ideas that can constitute a “map” of Montaigne’s political philosophy, we have analyzed – quantitatively and qualitatively – the contexts in which the French philosopher used the word “conflict”. The examples confirm the predominance of the interior level of the individual subject and less of the relationship of the individual to otherness. To be active in the public sphere, the individual needs modesty and moderation in the expression of his opinions, as well as a rational evaluation when he wishes major changes; otherwise, they risk doing more harm than good to others. The individual must struggle internally with the weapons of reason, so as not to give in to irrational desires – such as revenge or carnal desires – which would affect others, which is virtue. An inner balance is necessary, and the others will gain from this. (shrink)

It is a recent tendency to read certain pre- and early-modern thinkers as “anticipatory critics” of modernity; the name of Michel de Montaigne often comes up in this context. Most of the critical approaches treat Montaigne like a pre-Rousseau proto-romantic which is indeed is an important part of Montaigne’s thinking. However, as I show in this paper, his Essays also allow for a different interpretation. Namely, I demonstrate that 1) Montaigne’s appraisal of Nature is far (...) from a romantic-idyllic one; 2) his understanding of the interspecies division is more subtle than it is often thought; 3) his thought thus interpreted includes an ethics of becoming-animal that is based on a radically anti-Platonic body-mind economy. (shrink)

This text aims to address the concept of judgment (jugement) in Michel de Montaigne’s Essays and to show how this concept - which can indicate an act, a faculty, a quality, in short, the seat of intellectual, moral, and psychological life - becomes central not only in Montaigne’s thought but also in the subsequent history of philosophy. To do so, the text begins with an investigation of the concept of judgment itself, starting from its Greek roots in (...) the Stoic logic of Chrysippus, how it was appropriated by Aristotelian and medieval philosophy, and subsequently, how Montaigne reformulates its meaning, expanding and introducing it into modern philosophy by radically modifying the very assumption of the human act of philosophizing. Ultimately, the text seeks to answer the question: what does ‘judgment’ mean in the Essays and what is its significance for modern philosophy? (shrink)

Michel de Montaigne begins his magisterial ESSAIS by telling his readers that he, himself, is the matter of his book. He says that he has written himself so that after death he could remain in the world with those who knew and loved him. Montaignes intimate project, meant to be read by friends, has emerged as one of the most surprising and compelling accounts of the human condition ever written. Although Montaigne famously retired from public life to (...) write his essais, neither his concerns nor the activities recounted in ESSAIS is purely private. This volume of essays, based on papers presented at The A.V. Elliott Conference for Great Books and Ideas sponsored by Mercer Universitys McDonald Center for Americas Founding Principles, focuses on the outward oriented political philosophy of Montaigne. Contributors include Ann Hartle, Daniel Cullen, Christine Henderson, Eduardo Velasquez, Kevin Honeycutt, and Christopher Edelman. (shrink)

Michel de Montaigne ha sido considerado, desde la interpretación de Popkin, como el principal difusor del escepticismo clásico en el Renacimiento. El redescubrimiento del escepticismo a fines del siglo XVI habría coincidido con la ruptura protestante, por ello la cruz y la duda habrían formado pareja contra la amenaza de la Reforma y uno de los más insignes representantes de tal estrategia habría sido Montaigne entendido como pirrónico y católico. El expediente al que recurren la mayor parte (...) de los historiadores de las ideas para explicar tal conjunción de incredulidad escéptica y de fe seria el de "fideísmo escéptico", sin embargo, tal y como vienen mostrando recientes estudios, tales interpretaciones podrían requerir una amplia revisión. Para ello, nosotros, analizando la noción de fideísmo, así como las corrientes vinculadas a ésta de la teología negativa y el nominalismo en Michel de Montaigne, trataremos de mostrar el carácter no definitivo de muchos de los "tópicos" habitualmente manejados en las interpretaciones actuales más extendidas del escepticismo del autor francés. (shrink)

In response to Walter Benjamin's caveat that every image of the past not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably, this essay examines images of spitting in the work of Michel de Montaigne and Georges Bataille. By resisting insertion within codified cycles of exchange-especially those of institutionalized violence-their images exemplify a defiance to servitude that can be generalized to a theory of sovereignty. An archaeological inventory indicates possibilities provided by the montage (...) of images for the construction of a heterological counterhistory, where spit and spitting challenge the dominance of spirit in Western culture. (shrink)

Although the French Renaissance sceptic Michel de Montaigne is a much-admired thinker among many literary historians and some philosophical ones, his oeuvre hardly features in critical surveys of ideas in education. This is strange given that Montaigne offers modern educators an exemplary form of communicative discourse which anticipates contemporary education theory's emphasis on the importance of reflective practice and learning from experience. While each of these themes is capable of being rendered as repetitious slogans, sound-bites even, (...) class='Hi'>Montaigne, through his emphasis on free thinking and self-study, helps to rescue them from such a fate, identifying a dialectical method called ‘essaying’ which has genuine purchase on practice and its improvement. (shrink)

RESUMEN Los estudios actuales sobre la mentira priman su lado epistémico y desatienden los aspectos morales. Tal distinción es clara en los intentos de diferenciar la mentira de la intención de engañar, y tienen como contrapartida una concepción de la verdad realista. Por ello, las interpretaciones que cuestionan o minimizan la existencia de la Verdad tienden a ser rechazadas, y parece que tampoco podrían abordar satisfactoriamente la mentira. En este artículo cuestionaremos dicha asunción, mostrando cómo un autor del Renacimiento, (...) class='Hi'>Michel de Montaigne, sostiene una perspectiva "negadora" de la verdad y critica la mentira, precisamente destacando su dimensión moral. ABSTRACT Current studies on lying emphasize its epistemic side and neglect the moral aspects. Such a distinction is clear in the attempts to distinguish lying from the intention to deceive and has as a counterpart a realistic conception of truth. Therefore, interpretations that question the existence of truth, or that minimize it, tend to be rejected, and it seems that they could not satisfactorily address the lie either. In this article we will question this assumption, showing how a Renaissance author, Michel de Montaigne, maintains a "denying" perspective of truth while criticizing the lie, precisely by highlighting its moral dimension. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo tratar dos Ensaios de Michel de Montaigne a partir de uma perspectiva que leve em conta a íntima relação entre o pensamento filosófico e a sua expressão literária. Parte-se da suspeita de que há, na própria criação ensaística, um conteúdo filosófico cético, que é próprio deste autor. Neste sentido, o ensaio como gênero literário já não seria apenas o exercício livre do pensamento, mas constituiria a forma que exprime, da melhor maneira possível, os (...) efeitos causados pela “crise pirrônica” e, em especial, a constatação filosófica do caráter relativo do conhecimento humano. (shrink)

The ArgumentMontaigne'sEssayswere an exercise in self-knowledge carried out for more than twenty years in Montaigne's private library located in his mansion near Bordeaux. The library was a place of solitude as well as a place of knowledge, a kind ofheterotopiain which two sets of spatial relations coexisted and interacted: the social and the epistemic. The spatial demarcation and arrangement of the site – in both the physical and the symbolic sense – were necessary elements of the constitution of (...) class='Hi'>Montaigne's self as an object of knowledge and as a subject of discourse. The spatial setting of the library made possible and constrained certain discursive patterns through which words were systematically linked to things, authority was correlated with access and visibility, and the epistemological was coordinated with the social. In this sense, Montaigne's library resembled other places of empirical knowledge of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which subjects of knowledge were constituted, objects were posited in their proper phenomenal fields and the entire structure of intellectual activity was reproduced through various cultural mechanisms. But the initial similarity is only apparent. The private library never became a culturally recognized place for knowledge of the self; its heterotopic structure could not have been reproduced without the concrete presence of an author and of a self, while Montaigne's skepticism systematically undermined the possibility of the author's position and of the identity of the self. (shrink)

Montaigne est souvent présenté comme un défenseur inconditionnel de la liberté de conscience et de la tolérance, mais cette vision est simplificatrice. À une époque déchirée par les guerres de religion, Montaigne envisage la tolérance religieuse dans une perspective qui privilégie la pratique politique plutôt que les questions de principe. Le caractère largement insaisissable des croyances humaines rend la notion de liberté de conscience presque impossible à définir, et Montaigne ne s’y essaie pas même dans le chapitre (...) des Essais pourtant intitulé « De la liberté de conscience » (II, 19). La question de la tolérance religieuse relève de la « politique », en un sens non opportuniste du terme. (shrink)

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), author of the Essays (published in successive, revised and expanded editions from 1580 until after his death), deserves to be recognized as the first) philosophic architect of modern liberalism, that is, a doctrine that advocates the advancement of individual liberty (under law), and consequently a reduction in the scope and purpose of government to securing what are represented by Montaigne’s successors (Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and the American Founders) as people’s inherent rights to their (...) life, liberty, property, and the “pursuit of happiness” as they conceive it. His outward, periodic professions of extreme conservatism and of homage to the Catholic Church are merely a rhetorical cover designed to protect the author from being persecuted (and his book from being banned). As a practitioner of what he describes as esoteric rhetoric (attributing it to the ancient political philosophers), Montaigne invites careful readers to see through his rhetorical concealment by noting how his conservative professions are undermined by the overall train of his reasoning and argument. Although Montaigne’s argument for liberal individualism may have gone too far in its influence over the long run (that is, the 21st century), we citizens of modern liberal regimes owe him a debt of gratitude for helping to liberate us from the reign of arbitrary monarchs, oppressive aristocrats, and clerical oppressors. (shrink)

The Essays do not look like philosophy in any traditional sense: there are no arguments, conclusions, or proofs, and no apparent philosophical teaching. Yet, Montaigne does describe himself as a philosopher: “a new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher.” Unpremeditated and accidental philosophy, however, just looks like the formless and disordered thoughts of ordinary life and conversation. While philosophy is invisible, Montaigne himself is always visible. Philosophy disappears into the pre-philosophical at the same time and in the same (...) act by which Montaigne emerges into the public in his concrete particularity. The Essays do not look like philosophy because philosophy is not a teaching but an act, the act of bringing the private, common man into the public. At the same time and in the same act, Montaigne transforms both philosophy and human association: the philosophical act is the invention of modern society. (shrink)

Se presenta la obra de Vicente Raga Rosaleny sobre el escepticismo de Montaigne. Con el fin de resaltar la importancia de esta investigación, para el público hispanohablante, se hace una breve relación de los apartados acerca de Montaigne en algunas historias de la filosofía al uso, los cuales se caracterizan por su exigüidad y la reiteración de lugares comunes, sin ningún espíritu crítico; y, también, se muestra la suerte de los Ensayos en español, los cuales han estado signados (...) por la censura. Es en este escenario: de ausencias, lugares comunes y de tenue recepción y censura, que se debe valorar y acoger con la mayor fruición esta publicación. (shrink)